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“All the bloggers who exist to comment on us, the Googles and Ya-
hoo!s ... who rely on what we cover in the Middle East, who rely on
what we write about in California, and the nation, and Washington;
they wouldn’t exist if we didn’t. Our economic model is, obviously,
threatened. But if we disappeared tomorrow, they might have to rein-
vent something that looks like us.” Dean Baquet, Editor, Los Angeles
Times, quoted in “What you should know about the Newspaper Indus-
try”, by Jonathan Jones, Feb 27, 2007.
1 Introduction
The production and dissemination of ‘news’ has changed dramatically in the devel-
oped world since the mid-twentieth century. New media platforms have emerged,
there have been significant regulatory changes and news corporations have con-
glomerated. Popular opinion holds that this rapid transformation of the industry,
by facilitating concentration of ownership, has led to a deterioration in the quality
of news offered by the mainstream media and reduced the diversity of opinions ex-
pressed.1 Opinion polls indicate a falling public trust in the news media.2 Table
1 captures this trend; over time, there has been a gradual erosion in the share of
news audience that views mainstream news outlets favorably, with local TV news,
network TV news and newspapers receiving the harshest criticism. Hume (1996)
contends that while public confidence in most institutions has diminished in the
United States, journalism has fared the worst.
In the current digital era, news has gone online and comes in various forms
simultaneously including television, radio, podcasts, blogs etc., and we are wit-
nessing the emergence of a world market for news. Since the late 1990s, significant
increases in broadband penetration in households has allowed a disenchanted public
to move away from mainstream news sources and increasingly rely on the internet
as the main source of news. News suppliers have followed suit, taking their content
online and making it freely available to the public.3 Ironically, news suppliers point
to the online news model as a culprit for falling standards in the news industry.
Our starting quote above is by a media insider who clearly believes that on-
line commentators (bloggers) and news aggregation sites effectively steal the news
1See, for instance, McChesney (1999), Hume (1996) and Shah (2007)
2See the Pew Report (2007), “Views of Press Values and Performance: 1985-2007”, and Hume
(1996).
3A few outlets charge customers for viewing their content but the majority now allow free ac-
cess.
Table 1: News Media Favourability, 1985-2007
Favorable 2001-’07
opinion of 1985 1992 1997 2001 2005 2007 change
% % % % % % %
Local TV news 89 91** 84 83 79 79 -4
Daily newspapers 88 81 79 82 80 78 -4
Cable TV news+ 91* 95 86*** 88 79 75 -1.3
Network TV news 89 86 76 76 75 71 -5
Major national papers 81 81 67 74 61 60 -1.4
Source:PEW (2007), “Internet News Audience Highly Critical of News Organiza-
tions”, Apr 9
Note: Percentages based on those who could rate each.
*1987; **1991; ***1998
+ In 1989 and 1992, the question asked only about CNN. In 1998 and 2001, the
cable news question listed CNN and MSNBC as examples. In 2005 and 2007, the
Fox news channel was included as well.
gathered by professional news-gatherers and that this free-riding affects their long-
term prospects for survival. Many commentators share this view and assert that
these activities spell the end of serious news gathering, as it is now cheaper to re-
cycle someone else’s news than generate original content. Another complaint by
insiders is that the internet, and other new technologies, have reduced news quality
by increasing the job scope of journalists:
“...they say you’ve not only got to write the story, you’ve got to do the
audio version, the video version, you’ve got to do vodcasts and pod-
casts, that all takes more time as well and divides your concentration.
So that the quality of the work is going down even though the amount
and the variation of the product is increasing.” (Nick Davies, Journalist
and author, commenting on current journalistic standards, in an inter-
view for the 7.30 Report for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
27/08/2008)
Despite the clamor about falling standards in the media, there has been no
systematic investigation of the claim that the internet and related technologies have
affected the provision of high-quality news. This paper seeks to examine that claim.
Specifically, we investigate whether the internet era has reduced the demand and/or
supply of high-quality news. We examine longer-term trends in the media industry
preceding the online news era to distinguish secular trends from developments that
can be attributed to the internet and related technologies. Distilling the historical
information into a set of stylized facts, we model the impact of the internet on the
uptake of high-quality news.4
Our simple model captures three conflicting effects of the internet. The first
is that easy access to information on the internet makes it cheaper to provide high-
quality news and to disseminate it via the web, which increases the production of
such news. The second is that the existence of bloggers and news aggregators who
recycle the stories of news-providers reduces the effective property rights of the
high-quality news producers, thus reducing their incentives to invest in such news
production. The third is that the internet has reduced the search costs of finding
customers who generate the advertising revenue. Our model shows the conditions
under which these combined effects lead to a long-term reduction or expansion in
the provision of quality news. In isolation of the third effect, the second effect
dominates the first, in the long-run: the production of high-quality news, whose
costs do not go down at the same rate as the cost of information exchange on the
internet, only survives in large markets. However, the third effect makes any high-
quality news provision that attracts a minimum level of customers commercially
viable, even in the absence of property rights.
There is a small literature on the impact of the internet on media bias, on
product variety and product positioning, and on the composition of news consumers
for various sources of news. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine
the effect of the internet news era on the provision and uptake of high-quality news.
This is an issue of considerable importance, as an independent and critical media
industry is a cornerstone of participatory democracy. As such, any development that
affects the credibility of this industry has serious implications for the preservation
of an informed citizenry.
Section 2 provides a brief description of the structure of the U.S. media
industry and of major developments in the industry since the mid-twentieth century;
Section 3 presents a concise literature review on trends in news quality over time,
and synthesizes the findings into a list of stylized facts; Section 4 describes the
simple theoretical model; Section 5 concludes.
4While perceptions of news quality can be fairly subjective and difficult to define, for our pur-
poses, high-quality news refers to original reporting involving the collection and verification of facts,
and a clear and concise analysis of the same. Typically, the generation of high-quality news involves
investments of time and money.
2 Background - Media Industry in the U.S. and me-
dia concentration
Newspapers and radio dominated the news industry for the first half of the twentieth
century. Robinson (2007) classifies the second half of the twentieth century in terms
of the dominant news medium of the decade: the era of network news began in the
1960s with the advent of television and dominated the news scene up until the
1980s; the 1990s was the decade of Cable news characterized by 24-hour news
broadcasts, dominated largely by CNN; and the current decade marks the era of
digital or online news, facilitated by the world wide web.
Successive waves of innovation provided more types of news products to
consumers, with the long-term trend seeing technologies that reduced the dissem-
ination costs of news, thus allowing for larger audiences to be served. In addition
to changing technologies and institutions, the regulatory environment pushed the
industry towards consolidation of news sources, challenging the viability of smaller
media players.5
Economists have long recognized that news provision is a textbook case
of a natural monopoly, particularly for print media. News itself is a public good
in that it can be copied without dilution once produced and it is hard to exclude
consumers from it. News dissemination is also subject to increasing returns to
scale, because of scale economies in bulk printing, and the classic properties of
distribution networks. Early papers by Reddaway (1963) and Rosse (1967, 1970)
and by Dertouzos and Trautman (1990) found strong evidence of the existence of
scale economies in the newspaper industry.6 These characteristics imply that news
provision will tend towards monopolies who have to recoup costs indirectly with
advertising rather than circulation. The print media industry therefore invariably
charges low cover prices for its products.7
5See Neiva (1995) for an account of the technological and institutional changes that pushed the
U.S. newspaper industry towards consolidation; Berry and Waldfogel (1996) for regulatory changes
affecting radio; Einstein (2004) and McEwen (2007) for regulatory changes in television; Gomery
(2002) on regulation banning newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership; and “4 advances that set News
Back” (http://thefutureofnews.com/vision-future/advances/)
6Kaiser and Wright (2006) provide evidence of scale economies in the magazine industry in
Germany.
7Radio also relied almost exclusively on subsidies and advertising since it was basically impos-
sible to make people pay directly for radio reception. In the early days of television, advertisers bore
the full cost of broadcasting, allowing consumers costless access to news throughout the day. Later
on, with the advent of cable, it became possible for some specialized news channels to charge for
news directly though advertising remained the dominant source of revenue for television right up to
this day.
The traditional reliance on advertising in all the news media means that the
quote we started this paper with is slightly misleading: historically, the viability of
the news industry has not relied on making people pay for actual news, but rather
on persuading consumers to consume their news from the original news provider,
allowing the provider to recoup costs via advertising. In principle, it is hard to
see the fundamental difference that the internet has made to this reality: as long as
providers can package their news and persuade consumers to get their news from
the original source, they can still reap the advertising revenue that goes with it.
From the late 1990s until recently, the economic model adopted by the on-
line media industry did indeed rely almost solely on advertising revenue. Advertis-
ers supported the migration of news content online by moving their business online
as well. However, in contrast to the traditional model, the principal beneficiaries
of online advertising revenue have not been the content-creators but the web por-
tals, search engines and news aggregators that relied on content-creators for news
(Isaacson, 2009). From an economic point of view, these search engines and news
aggregators are intermediaries that skim off the rents created by news provision.
Table 2 presents the shift in advertising shares between 2006 and 2007 at 17
major media companies, including Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, Time Warner, Dis-
ney, Viacom, CBS and Clear Channel. These companies span the online, TV, print,
radio and outdoor advertising sectors. The table reveals that the combined adver-
tising revenue of these 17 companies grew by 6% between the second quarters and
8% between the third quarters of 2006-’07. Offline revenue grew by less than 1%
over the same periods, even after the inclusion of affiliate fees and global revenue
at CBS, Viacom and News Corp. Online advertising revenue contributed 26% and
30% to this growth in the second and third quarters respectively. One would expect
the scope for such rent-skimming to reduce over time as consumers become more
discerning in their search for news, and producers come up with strategies to attract
consumers directly to their websites.8 Nevertheless, the downturn in the advertising
industry in general, and internet advertising in particular since 2008, has exposed
the vulnerability of this model to changes in economic conditions (Mutter, 2009).
3 News Quality in recent times
Currently, five major companies dominate most of the media (Bagdikian, 2004).
These companies are entertainment conglomerates that have vertically integrated
8“If visitors come from Google to stories deep in the paper and then leave, Google gets the
dollars and we get only cents, but if we can bring them in through the front page we can charge
Uˆ19,000 [$25,000] for a 24-hour banner ad.” (Sverre Munck, executive vice-president of interna-
tional business for Schibsted, a Norwegian newspaper firm, quoted in the Economist, 2006)
Table 2: U.S. Advertising Revenue (US$ Millions) at 17 Major Media
Companies by Sector (2006-’07)
Qtr2 Qtr2 Growth Qtr3 Qtr3 Growth
Ad Revenue 2006 2007 (%) 2006 2007 (%)
Total 15,490 16,358 6% 14,695 15,804 8%
Of which:
Traditional Media 12,141 12,143 0% 11,288 11,381 1%
Share 78% 74% 77% 72%
Online Media 3,349 4,215 26% 3,407 4,423 30%
Share 22% 26% 23% 28%
a. Google 1,421 2,030 43% 1,507 2,201 46%
Share 9% 12% 10% 14%
b. Yahoo 1,070 1,119 5% 1,054 1,195 13%
Share 7% 7% 7% 8%
c. AOL 449 522 16% 479 540 13%
Share 3% 3% 3% 3%
d. Microsoft 409 544 33% 367 487 33%
Share 3% 3% 2% 3%
Source: Blodget (2008)
Note: Companies include Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, Time
Warner, Disney, Viacom, CBS and Clear Chanel, spanning all ma-
jor advertising sectors: Online, TV, Print, Radio and Outdoor.
across various industries such as distribution networks, toys and clothing manu-
facture and retailing, allowing them to increase their market power by integrating
marketing efforts across different sectors of the media (McChesney, 1999). Many
industry observers contend that this unchecked market power has eroded the qual-
ity of news, increased partisanship and imposed constraints on the range of issues
covered by the Press as well as diversity of opinions expressed.9
3.1 The demand and supply of quality news
The Pew research center’s News interest indices (NII) measure the extent of the
American public’s interest in various news events.10. These indices suggest that
9“One cannot expect Disney, for example, to talk too much about sweatshop labor when it is
accused of being involved in such things itself.” (Shah, 2009)
10These indices are based on surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and
the Press. See http://people-press.org/
audience interest in various types of news has remained stable since the 1980s,
despite the changing composition of news offered by different media platforms.
The trends in Figure 1 support this view. While interest in news related to money
has trended upwards, there is no other meaningful trend. Importantly, there is no
shift in audience tastes towards less serious topics; interest in tabloid news, for
instance, has remained low and stable over time. However, there is evidence of
sizable discrepancies between the media industry’s coverage of news events and
consumer preferences.
Figure 1: News Attention Paid to 6 Super Categories of News, 
By News Era
(% following "very closely")
   Source: PEW (2007), News Interest Index 1986-2007, Part 2
   pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/NewsInterest1986-2007Part2.pdf
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Figure 2 highlights the ‘news hole’ for various events, the gap between the
public’s interest in a news item and the media’s coverage of that event. The figure
indicates that what the news media was delivering, did not necessarily accord with
audience preferences in terms of coverage. One explanation offered for this mis-
match between demand and supply is that the news industry’s cost-cutting measures
have eroded product quality and driven away their core audiences, those individuals
who have traditionally been regular followers of news (Patterson, 2001).
According to the Newspaper Association of America, the number of people
employed in the newspaper industry fell by 18% between 1990 and 2004. High-
quality international news coverage has been a big casualty of these staff cutbacks
(Carroll, 2007 and Miller, 2008), as revealed by the following stark statistic: in
Figure 2: Public Interest vs. Media Coverage, 2007
    Source: Project for Excellence in Journalism (2007), A Year in the News
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2000, two-thirds of the 282 foreign correspondents working abroad for U.S. dailies
as either full-timef staff or on exclusive contracts were employed by only four daily
newspapers - Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, New York Times and Los An-
geles Times. The remainder of over 1,400 dailies had less than a 100 foreign cor-
respondents among them (UNPAN, 2001). Most newspapers now rely on either
recycled news from Reuters, the Associated Press (AP) or New York Times wire
services, or on mobile journalists who fly into various hot spots to report on the lat-
est crisis. Such reporting invariably lacks cultural perspective and in-depth analysis
(Fleeson, 2003). News outlets that have invested in producing high quality news,
have enjoyed recognition by their peers as well as high demand.
Table 3 reveals that the four dailies with the largest number of foreign cor-
respondents between themselves won the coveted Pulitzer prize for international
reporting in 20 of the 29 years between 1980-2008, signalling high journalistic stan-
dards. Since the late 1990s, these dailies have effectively monopolized the Pulitzer
prize for this category. Moreover, as Table 4 reports, they have consistently featured
among the top ten dailies in the U.S. in terms of circulation. All the above evidence
suggests that the demand for high-quality news has remained strong.
Table 3: Winners of Pulitzer Prize for Journalism
for International Reporting
Year News Daily
1980 Louisville Courier-Journal
1981 The Miami Herald
1982 New York Times
1983 New York Times; Washington Post
1984 Wall Street Journal
1985 Newsday,N.Y.
1986 San Jose (CA) Mercury News
1987 Los Angeles Times
1988 New York Times
1989 New York Times; Washington Post
1990 New York Times
1991 New York Times; Washington Post
1992 Newsday,N.Y.
1993 Newsday,N.Y.; New York Times
1994 Dallas Morning News
1995 Associated Press
1996 Christian Science Monitor
1997 New York Times
1998 New York Times
1999 Wall Street Journal
2000 Village Voice
2001 Wall Street Journal
2002 New York Times
2003 Washington Post
2004 Washington Post
2005 Los Angeles Times/Newsday, N.Y.
2006 New York Times
2007 Wall Street Journal
2008 Washington Post
Source: www.pulitzer.org
Table 5 presents a different and more direct measure of quality - seven read-
ability indices for three newspapers - the New York Times, Christian Science Moni-
tor and the Washington Post - over time. These indices are based on formulae that
have been developed to assess the quality of written text, in terms of the ease of
Table 4: Top 10 U.S. Newspapers, 2006-’08
2006 2007 2008
1 USA Today USA Today USA Today
2 The Wall Street Journal The Wall Street Journal The Wall Street Journal
3 The New York Times The New York Times The New York Times
4 Los Angeles Times Los Angeles Times Los Angeles Times
5 The New York Post New York Daily News New York Daily News
6 New York Daily News The New York Post The New York Post
7 The Washington Post The Washington Post The Washington Post
8 Chicago Tribune Chicago Tribune Chicago Tribune
9 Houston Chronicle Houston Chronicle Houston Chronicle
10 Newsday (Long Island) Arizona Republic-
Phoenix
Arizona Republic-
Phoenix
Source: Audit Bureau of Circulations;
Note: Ranked by weekday averages for 6 months ending 30th
September
comprehension for readers. Each uses a different formula for predicting readability
but essentially, they all look at the lengths of words and sentences. This is obvi-
ously not a critique-free means of measuring quality but does measure the degree
to which the text taxes the reader.11 To assess the readability of various newspaper
articles, we selected one article from a March issue in every decade from the online
archives of the respective newspaper websites. To the extent possible, we restricted
our attention to editorial articles, since these are most reflective of the writing style
followed by the newspapers.
11Some, like the Flesch-Kincaid measure and the Flesch reading ease formula, are based on
the number of syllables per word and the average sentence length, while others like the ARI and
the Coleman-Liau, are based on the number of characters per word and sentence length. See
http://www.readability.info/info.shtml for the formulae used in computing these indices. With the
exception of the Flesch index, all other measures report the output in terms of a U.S. grade-school
level required to comprehend the text.
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The different measures of readability in Table 5 are generally consistent.
They suggest that while the Washington Post appears to adopt a more complex
writing style relative to the other two dailies, the trends in each of the dailies have
remained quite stable over time; there is no evidence of any ‘dumbing down’ in
the writing style. Clearly, these measures are quite limited; they do not capture
any deeper characteristics of writing such as coherence of argument or quality of
analysis. Nevertheless, they are objective measures of the surface readability of
representative articles. The indices in Table 5 suggest that in terms of various read-
ability metrics, these dailies have maintained their standards over time.
Trends in circulation of news magazines also suggest that audiences have
gravitated towards outlets that specialize in particular types of news or analysis.
The Economist magazine, for instance, specializes in in-depth foreign economic
news from all corners of the globe. At a time when news magazines like Time and
Newsweek were moving away from hard news12, readership of the Economist mag-
azine increased dramatically. Since 1993, the magazine has more than doubled its
readership in the U.S., which now accounts for over half of its world-wide sales
(Langfitt, 2006). This dramatic increase in circulation is further evidence that there
is a sizeable audience for high-quality news in the U.S. Other specialized magazines
such as the New Yorker and the Week have all seen their circulation rise substantially
during the last 20 years.13 Figure 3 attests to this rising trend, while Figure 4 traces
the gradual erosion in readership among the magazines that were traditionally con-
sidered the ‘big three’ - Newsweek, Time and U.S. News. All three face circulation
numbers that are below their respective 1988 levels.
A different measure of news quality is the composition of hard versus soft
news on offer.14 Several high-profile news organizations have adopted an editorial
direction towards a more tabloid style in the last 10 years, as a means of lowering
their costs.15 Patterson (2001) documents a discernible shift away from traditional,
hard news towards softer content among different media platforms between 1980
and 1999. According to his analysis, news stories with moderate to high levels of
sensationalism have increased from 25% to 40%, news stories with a human interest
12See Nisbet, 2001
13The National Geographic magazine, specializing in geography, culture and environmental
issues, has similarly retained its high standards for quality for well over a century and is cur-
rently published in over 31 languages, with a combined circulation of over 9 million annually
(http://www.answers.com/topic/national-geographic-society)
14Patterson (2001) defines ‘hard’ news as information that is important to citizens’ ability to
understand and respond to the world of public affairs. Examples include breaking events involving
top leaders, major issues, or significant disruptions in the routines of daily life, such as an earthquake
or airline disaster. ‘Soft’ news or tabloid news, on the other hand, is news unrelated to public affairs
or policy, and is more sensational and/or more personality or celebrity-oriented.
15See Miller (2008), http://www.pri.org/global-news.html
Figure 3: Circulation of Non-Traditional Magazines in the U.S
1988-2004
Source: Project for Excellence in Journalism (2006), Magazine Audience
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element have increased from 11% to 26%, and news stories relating to crime and
disasters have increased from 8% to over 13% during this period. However, as
mentioned earlier (see Figure 1), data from opinion polls indicates no evidence of a
concomitant shift in the public’s preferences towards soft news.
These trends suggest that it is not so much that high-quality news is no
longer produced or disseminated, but rather that it has become a truly specialized
commodity. With the mainstream media implementing staff cut-backs, eschewing
in-house reporting and relying more and more on syndicated news, consumers inter-
ested in original, high-quality reporting have gravitated towards specialist providers
of such news. As a result, we are now witnessing a more segmented market for
news.
3.2 The direct effects of the internet
The emergence of the World Wide Web in the mid-1990s signalled a new era in
publishing and redefined the traditional newspaper audience. In 2008, 55% of all
Figure 4: Circulation Among 'Big Three' News Magazines in the U.S.
1988-2004
Source: Project for Excellence in Journalism (2006), Magazine Audience
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adult Americans had a high-speed internet connection at home (Pew, 2008). As a
consequence, the internet has drawn news audiences away from mainstream media
sources. Gentzkow (2007) provides some evidence in support of this; he examined
whether the advent of online news has complemented or crowded out print news-
papers. Using microdata from the Washington DC market and carefully controlling
for unobserved consumer heterogeneity, he found that on average, online news re-
duces readership of print news by 27,000 readers per day and costs firms US$ 5.5
million per year in lost print profits.16
A large section of the print and visual media has responded by embracing
the Web, taking its content online and integrating audio and video features on the
internet sites. Previously, newspapers reserved their best journalists for the print
versions. Now they are contributing to their online versions, as the second quote in
the introduction testified to. Table 6 records the steep increase in visitor traffic to
online newspaper websites since 2006, and Table 7 presents revenues of newspapers
from their online operations in 2006, classified by circulation.
16Filistrucchi (2005) provides similar evidence for Italy.
Table 6: Total Web Audience for Newspaper Websites, 2006-’09
Unique Active Web Page Pages/ Time/Person Visits/
Audience Reach % Views Person (hh:mm:ss) Person
(millions) (millions)
Jan-09 74.81 44.34 3725.77 49.80 00: 45: 58 8.48
Dec-08 66.67 40.13 2959.56 44.39 00: 42: 18 8.46
Nov-08 69.05 40.77 3276.17 47.45 00: 45: 02 8.69
Oct-08 68.97 42.17 3537.25 51.29 00: 49: 08 9.27
Sep-08 67.7 41.53 3686.18 54.45 00: 49: 20 9.20
Aug-08 69.31 41.52 3421.61 49.36 00: 43: 18 8.52
Jul-08 67.95 41.21 3410.22 50.19 00: 44: 49 8.48
Jun-08 65.42 39.89 3137.65 47.96 00: 40: 23 8.17
May-08 69.41 41.70 3040.57 43.81 00: 39: 51 7.91
Apr-08 64.34 39.11 2851.47 44.32 00: 41: 13 8.15
Mar-08 65.69 39.90 3111.86 47.38 00: 43: 37 8.30
Feb-08 66.55 41.00 3064.61 46.05 00: 43: 09 8.07
Jan-08 66.88 41.32 3228.54 48.27 00: 45: 49 8.48
Dec-07 63.05 38.20 2888.76 45.82 00: 41: 57 7.83
Nov-07 62.28 38.88 2939.5 47.20 00: 42: 20 7.94
Oct-07 63.21 39.77 3240.78 51.27 00: 46: 44 8.59
Sep-07 58.16 36.96 2836.33 48.77 00: 43: 44 8.15
Aug-07 59.28 37.42 2828.61 47.72 00: 41: 52 8.22
Jul-07 59.64 37.05 2735.02 45.86 00: 40: 07 8.00
Jun-07 58.62 36.74 2507.51 42.77 00: 39: 55 7.55
May-07 60.25 37.78 2726.83 45.26 00: 40: 16 7.91
Apr-07 58.68 37.40 2761.3 47.06 00: 42: 01 8.01
Mar-07 59.6 37.74 2987.84 50.13 00: 44: 09 8.56
Feb-07 58.76 37.47 2827.94 48.12 00: 43: 33 7.94
Jan-07 58.9 37.56 3149.86 53.48 00: 49: 11 8.67
Dec-06 56.01 34.68 2688.69 48.00 00: 42: 55 7.80
Nov-06 58.13 36.33 2792.08 48.03 00: 41: 59 7.93
Oct-06 58.72 37.18 2975.45 50.67 00: 44: 04 8.16
Sep-06 58.19 37.03 2781.41 47.80 00: 42: 01 7.94
Aug-06 57.96 37.23 2779.65 47.96 00: 43: 17 8.21
Jul-06 54.65 35.29 2550.84 46.68 00: 39: 19 7.92
Jun-06 54.5 34.99 2532.26 46.46 00: 39: 10 8.01
Source: Nielsen Online, MegaPanel Data
http://www.naa.org/TrendsandNumbers/Newspaper-Websites.aspx
Table 7: Newspaper Websites - Unique Visitors Vs. Online Revenue in 2006
# Unique <= $0.5 $0.5 m - $1m - $5m - $10m - >= $15m
Visitors million 1m 5m 10m 15m
<=25000 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
25,001-50,000 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
50,001-100,000 71% 21% 7% 0% 0% 0%
100,001-250,000 43% 23% 30% 0% 0% 0%
250,001-500,000 17% 13% 52% 17% 0% 0%
500,001-1,00,000 17% 6% 28% 50% 0% 0%
> 1,000,000 4% 0% 0% 12% 20% 64%
Source: Lawton (2007)
The circulation numbers in Table 6 indicate a substantial growth in online
news audience and the cross-tabulations in Table 7 suggest that advertising-based
internet news-provision has been a viable business model. Recent examples of
news outlets switching to online news include the century-old Christian Science
Monitor which decided to reduce its costs by abandoning its daily print edition and
moving to an exclusively online edition. Significantly, the paper announced that
such a move would allow it to keep its eight foreign bureaus open. In March 2009,
the Seattle-based daily Post-Intelligencer, founded in 1863 and currently owned by
the Hearst Corporation, also announced its decision to abandon its print edition to
move online, in a bid to bring down its operating losses. Thus, some newspapers
are converting from hard-copies to internet-based outlets.
Another impact of broadband expansion has been on the state of journalism
itself. Facilitated by the development of interactive tools like Live Journal and blog-
ger.com, it has created a community of bloggers who perform three functions: (i)
express opinions on various topics and invite comment; some newspapers are bring-
ing popular blogs into their domain and generating content through these channels.
For example, the online edition of the New York Times hosts the ‘Freakonomics’
blog. This would seem a clear move to retain the advertising revenue generated by
providing a bundle of news; (ii) conflate information from various original sources
including newspapers; Web-based news aggregators like Google news and My Ya-
hoo facilitate this activity, as do user-driven news sites like Reddit and Digg, by
posting those news items that online viewers find most interesting; and (iii) bring
key information to public light. The third function has made blogging a powerful
medium for the dissemination of news and created a corps of self-appointed ‘citizen
journalists’.17 Supporters of this new form of participatory journalism assert that
blogs have become “a powerful antidote to media consolidation.” (Drum, 2007).
Hume (1995) has asserted that the internet could be a powerful disciplinary de-
vice for journalists: “As consumers start experimenting in cyberspace, journalists
need to address more urgently not the delivery format but the quality of their core
product: reliable and useful information on which citizens can act.” (p.153)
3.3 Stylized facts
The review above generates the following stylized facts we wish to provide a simple
model for:
1. The news industry is dominated by local and global monopolies on particular
markets.
2. While the demand for quality news appears stable, the provision has become
more specialized: the quality of the top brands does not appear compro-
mised but mainstream news provision has become increasingly de-coupled
from quality news.
3. The business model of the internet is similar to that of early television: costs
are recouped via the traffic attracted to a bundle of news that generates adver-
tising opportunities.
In the following section, we develop a simple model to capture these stylized
facts.
4 Model
We consider the market for high-quality news where we see high-quality news as
a combination of primary news provision (generated at cost C0), and checking the
statements made by primary news providers (at cost c). The checking of primary
news is in effect an intermediary role which requires looking up references and
follow-up, which is a cost that is intimately related to the internet in that the cheaper
cost of information dissemination on the internet directly reduces the cost of check-
ing facts. In the remainder, the effect of the increasing presence of the internet
will always work via a reduction in the search costs captured by c. The generation
17A number of scandals that caused prominent public figures to resign their official positions -
for example, Trent Lott as the U.S. Senate majority leader in 2002, and Dan Rather as a television
journalist on CBS in 2005 - were initiated by blogs.
of original news content requires travel, information gathering, interviewing news
sources, synthesizing information etc, and carries a cost taken to be invariant to the
internet.18. The two activities go into a composite commodity called high-quality
news that carries unit costs of C0+c per period. We do not distinguish between the
provision of news via a physical medium and the internet, implying that our model
includes internet news providers. We will first only consider business models where
news has to pay for itself, and then later include the role of advertising.
On the buyer side of the market, there is a continuum of consumers of mea-
sure M whose willingness to pay for high-quality news is uniformly distributed
between 0 and γ.19 We interpret M as the size of the community interested in the
specific high-quality news offered by a provider. We can think of a small M as
the market for high-quality news on local politics and a high M as the market for
high-quality news on national or international politics. This means that the same
individual can be in several markets at the same time. We summarize this inter-
pretation by presuming that there is a continuum of markets for different types of
high-quality news, each associated with a particular M. We denote the cdf of this
distribution as Q(M) whose pdf q(M) we presume exists and is continuous and
positive on ∞> M > 0.
We assume that buyers are able to observe the costs made by the producers
of high-quality news and thus know who is providing high-quality news and who is
not. Whilst this assumption is probably invalid in the short-run because it may take
agents some time to find out how much effort a news provider actually puts into
providing high-quality news, long-run reputation is linked to the real actions of the
news providers. In this sense, our model should be seen as a long-run model that
abstracts from the short-run possibility that reputations are imperfect.
As to market interaction, we assume classic Bertrand competition with a
first-mover who can produce news after which a competitor would have to decide
whether or not to enter. Then, there will only be one producer because any second
mover knows the ensuing price war would lead to a loss, since high-quality news
only needs to be produced once after which it can be sold on for nothing. Hence the
first-mover will have a natural monopoly in its production. This assumption implies
we really only analyze whether or not a market is active. The profit function for an
active monopolist on market M as a function of its price reads:
pi(p,M) = Mp(
γ− p
γ
)−C0− c
18What is important is not that C0 is completely independent of the cost of the internet but that it
goes down less than proportionally with c.
19In later extensions we will interpret this distribution in willingness to pay as the opportunity
cost of searching for a free copy.
where γ−pγ is the proportion of potential buyers willing to pay p for the high-quality
news. This function has a maximum at p = γ2 and profits are non-negative as long
as
M > 4
C0+ c
γ
The proportion of markets to which high-quality news is provided is denoted
as N and equals 1−Q(4C0+cγ ). This means that a decrease in the cost of checking
information (c) would lead to an increase in the proportion of markets for which
high-quality news is provided by an amount
dN
d(−c) =
4
γ
q(4
C0+ c
γ
)
which is strictly positive. This is the positive effect of the internet on the provision
of high-quality news.
This basic case also gives a natural framework in which to think about the
specialisation and de-bundling that has taken place in the market for news with
the advent of the internet. We can see the introduction of the internet as a one-off
merging of many geographically separated markets. This effectively means that
all the geographically local monopolists, who would have provided both local and
non-local news, suddenly had to compete with international competitors for non-
local news, which would quickly have lead to a single global monopolist on any
particular non-local news area. The local monopolists would remain as the global
monopolist’ of local news (including local human interest stories, local politics,
local sports, etc.). The observed de-bundling of news is then the visible impact of
the previous local monopolist being undercut by global specialised competitors on
non-local news, leading local news providers to no longer supply the local market
for non-local news.
4.1 The effect of adding blogging and news aggregation
One of the activities of bloggers and news aggregators is to recycle the informa-
tion generated by news providers. They comment on and effectively re-publish the
articles and information in question. This means that to access bloggers and ag-
gregators on particular topics is getting the quality signal of the high-quality news
provider for free. However, there is a cost associated with finding the right site,
just as before the advent of the internet there was a cost associated with getting
a free copy of a high-quality news publication. Before the advent of the internet,
one could go to news cafe´s or peek at the paper of the person sitting alongside on
the train, thus avoiding having to pay for the high-quality news. With the internet,
blogging and aggregators allows the same kind of access but at a lower price.
Formalizing this argument, we presume that individuals are distributed uni-
formly on a [0,H] scale where h ∈ [0,H] denotes the effective number of searches
an individual needs to make in order to obtain a piece of high-quality news for free.
One can interpret this distribution as the distribution of the opportunity cost of in-
dividuals, or alternatively as the shame they experience when searching for a free
copy of something that is actually priced. The actual cost that someone then incurs
is the number of searches needed to find a free copy times the marginal cost per unit
of search, i.e. hc where c is again a measure of the search costs that get reduced
via the internet. We can interpret this heterogeneity in search costs hc as the source
of an individual’s willingness to pay while in terms of enjoyment of high-quality
news, all consumers gain the same level of utility γ. The proportion of consumers
on market M who will buy a piece of high-quality news at price p then becomes
(min(γ,Hc)− p)/Hc. Ignoring the trivially complicating possibility that γ < Hc,
this means we take the profit problem for the firm with blogging in market M to be
pi = Mp(
Hc− p
Hc
)−C0− c
which is maximized at p = Hc2 and pi
∗ = c(M H4 −1)−C0. The effect of a reduction
in the marginal cost of searching for information (c) now equals
dpi∗
d(−c) =−M
H
4
+1
where the second term shows the positive effect of reduced cost, but the first term
shows the effect of loss of market size due to the increase in customers turning to
bloggers and aggregators rather than buying high-quality news. Note that it has to
be the case that M H4 > 1 for all markets with positive profits, implying that
dpi∗
d(−c) <
0. Profits are positive in those markets where
M > 4
1+ C0c
H
which means that a decrease in cost now has a different effect on the number of
markets provided with a high-quality news service:
dN
d(−c) =
−4C0
c2H
q(4
1+ C0c
H
)
This implies that the number of active markets will decrease with the advent of the
combination of internet and blogging under a business model in which news has to
pay for itself.
As to welfare implications, we note that the consumer surplus of high-
quality news of price 0 equals Mγ. Hence, in the absence of concerns about conflict
of interest - for instance, that elected officials may be controlling a media that is
supposed to be the public’s watchdog monitoring the activities of those very same
elected officials - there is a welfare argument that all markets with Mγ > C0 + c
should have a state-provider. If we interpret the market for high-quality news as the
market for news on the misdeeds of the government, then there is no valid case for
state-provision of that good. There might still be a case for provision by indepen-
dent organizations like non-profits.
4.2 Further long-term implications: market separation
We conceptualize high-quality news provision as effectively offering two distinct
services. One is the intermediary service of checking the factual validity of state-
ments, which comes at a marginal cost proportional to the search cost of the inter-
net. We are here thinking of news providers taking the stories of the news agencies
(TASS/Reuters) and doing no more than a quick google-check on consistency of
numbers brought out by press-statements, with data from other online sources such
as statistical agencies or online encyclopedias. The second is generating new infor-
mation at a fixed-price unrelated to the cost of the internet. This includes, among
other things, interviewing various human sources, on-site inspections, and other
news-making activities that cannot be conducted from behind a computer. While
traditional high-quality media can be seen as a combination of both, one can envis-
age these two activities being separated into what we denote as ‘News-making’ and
‘News-checking’. We can introduce these two activities by simply having markets
for single units of local ‘new news’ with a cdf of Q∗(M) and markets for single
units of ‘checked-news’ with a cdf of Q+(M). In order to avoid introducing more
superfluous notation, we keep the willingness-to-pay parameters the same as above.
The proportion of the markets for news-making that is active, N∗, will de-
crease with the advent of blogging. Following the same chain of reasoning as above
and assuming for simplicity that we can split the markets for a unit, the change in
the market for news-making due to the reduction in search costs for high-quality
news as a result of blogging on the internet will be
dN∗
d(−c) =
−4C0
c2H
q∗(4
C0
c
H
)
which is strictly negative.
The markets for news-checking will see a different effect: following the
same chain of reasoning as above, the profits in active markets will be:
pi = Mp(
Hc− p
Hc
)− c
= c(M
H
4
−1)
which goes up linearly in c. The proportion of active markets is given by
N+ = 1−Q+( 4
H
)
which is independent of c, implying that there is no change in the amount of news-
checking that goes on with the advent of blogging: the reduction in the cost of
checking facts is at the same rate as the reduction in the cost of finding ‘checked-
news’ on a blog. Hence all that blogging does is to reduce the profits made by a
‘news-checker’, not the level of activity. This outcome would change in obvious
ways if the costs-of news checking are not proportional to the search costs of blog-
consumers and blog-producers. If there is a fixed cost of news-checking that is
relatively higher than the fixed cost of blog-consumption or production, then news-
checking starts to suffer from the same problem as news making in that its fixed
costs will not be recouped as search costs go to zero.
4.3 The role of advertising
We argued in the empirical section that a large proportion of the revenue for news
providers, both on-line and off-line, is not from the direct sale of vetted news but
from advertising. Advertisers want to reach many people and as such, it is the
volume of sales that is a prime determinant of the price of advertising space. A
constraint newspapers face in compensating their consumers for advertisements by
lowering their price is that they cannot charge negative prices, effectively because
they cannot force their readers to read the newspapers they have been bribed to
receive.
We incorporate the basic approach of Gaszewicz et al. (2006) regarding ad-
vertising to our model. They assume that consumers dislike advertising, while the
marginal gain to advertisers decreases with additional advertisements. We bring
these assumptions into our model by presuming that newspapers offer a price-
advertisement package {p,a} and that consumers have a marginal distaste for each
unit of advertising equal to f . This means that a consumer will prefer to search for
advertisement-free online news if h < p+ f a.
The marginal value of an additional ad to advertisers is taken to be linear in
the number of readers, i.e. the marginal value to advertisers is
g∗M
∫ Hc
0
I[h < p+ f a]
Hc
dh,
where g > 0. Here, ∫ Hc
0
I[h < p+ f a]
Hc
dh =
Hc− p− f a
Hc
denotes the proportion of potential readers buying their hard news from the origi-
nator.
Since the news provider can extract all the rents from the advertisers by
charging them the price gM Hc−p− f aHc per unit of avertising a, we can write the profit
function in the market of news-making as:
pi = M[p+ag]
Hc− p− f a
Hc
−C0
This implies that in equilibrium either a or p will equal zero. If the marginal
value of advertising to the advertiser is higher than the marginal distaste to the
consumer (g > f ), then p = 0 and a = Hc2 f . If instead g < f then a = 0 and p =
Hc
2 .
In the case that advertising effectively is unprofitable (g > f ), we are back in the
case above, so we need only here look at the case with advertising. Profits are then
positive as long as
M >
4 fC0
gHc
which implies that M monotonically decreases with c and hence the number of ac-
tive markets goes up as the costs of search goes up. Conversely at low values of
c, only those markets whose costs can be recouped via advertising by a sufficient
number of potentially interested customers are active. This result has the intuitive
implication that with a ‘perfect’ internet, on which the search costs become arbi-
trarily close to zero, there are less active markets for news-making than with an im-
perfect internet with higher search costs. If the importance of advertising increases
(meaning that gf increases) then the number of active markets increases.
In the market for news-checking we get a slightly different result. Profits
are positive as long as
M >
4 f
gH
which is hence independent of c under the crucial assumption that both the costs
of news checking and the cost of avoiding advertising decrease at the same rate
when advertising is the only source of income. We thus find that news-checking
is unaffected from further reductions of search costs via the internet, whilst news-
making suffers.
Any additional rent-skimming on the revenue of avertising, such as via
news aggregators and search engines, can be seen from the viewpoint of the news
provider as a reduction in the marginal price they can charge the advertiser and thus
as a decrease in g.
4.4 Endogenous quality
So far, we have conceptualised quality as being innate to a particular market and
merely wondered which markets would be active. This leaves no room for markets
that continue being served but where quality levels have gone down; many argue
this has happened to the mass market. In this final sub-section we try to capture the
main effect of the internet on quality by taking an alternative modelling approach
to the one above. For the purposes of this section hence, we consider a single
market, including the possibility of advertising as above, where the cost to a news
maker of generating a quality z equals C(z) which is increasing and convex in z with
C(0) =C0.
We envisage the role of the internet now as providing free-entry to a com-
petitor (entrant) who offers a related product to the monopolist news-maker. In
order to allow for a role of the internet that is different from directly copying the
product of a news-maker (which is similar to the situation above, the only question
being how difficult it is for individuals to find the competitor), we now envisage
the entrant as someone who is able to only copy the product of the news maker
imperfectly, i.e. the quality offered by the entrant equals z˜ = z ∗ b with 0 < b < 1.
The total costs of this new entrant equals c which we again interpret as a search
cost. The advent of the internet is hence, as before, conceptualised as a decrease in
c. Consumers are now characterised by both a fixed marginal distaste of advertise-
ments while having a uniformly distributed marginal taste for quality on [0,γ]. We
abstract from any costs consumers might incur in order to find the online competi-
tor and merely look at the quality motive consumers might have in order to remain
with a news maker.
The choices of the news maker are the level of quality z, the price charged
p, and the amount of advertising a0. The choices of the entrant are whether to exist,
and how much advertising a1 to have. The news maker is the first mover and we are
looking for a subgame perfect equilibrium. The number of consumers that will buy
from a newsmaker equal
1
γ
∫ γ
1
I[qz− p− f a0 > max{0,qzb− f a1}]dq
while the number of consumers going to the internet entrant will equal
1
γ
∫ γ
1
I[qzb− f a1 > max{0,qz− p− f a0}]dq
The profit function of the news maker reads
pi0 =
p+ga0
γ
∫ γ
1
I[qz− p− f a0 > max{0,qzb− f a1}]dq−C(z)
The profit function of the entrant reads
pi1 =
ga1
γ
∫ γ
0
I[qzb− f a1 > max{0,qz− p− f a0}]dq− c
We solve the model backwards. Given the choices by the newsmaker, if
there is a market where both the news maker and the new entrant are active, the
market for consumers has to be segmented because the news maker will always have
greater appeal to consumers more interested in high-quality news. In the segmented
market, consumers with a taste for quality in the range q∈ [0, f a1zb ] will not consume
any news because of the advertising involved. Consumers in the range
q ∈ [ f a1
zb
,
p+ f (a0−a1)
z(1−b) ]
will consume the entrant’s product. Consumers in the range
q ∈ [ p+ f (a0−a1)
z(1−b) ,γ]
will consume from the news maker.
With this in mind, the optimal choice of an entrant must solve
dpi1
da1
=
g( p+ f (a0−a1)z(1−b) − f a1zb )
γ
− ga1
γ
f
zb(1−b) = 0
and the entrant will only be active if profits are higher than 0. For the news maker,
the optimal choices once again involve either no advertising or zero-pricing, de-
pending on whether g > f or vice versa. The more interesting case is when there is
zero-advertising for the news maker, though in reality the opposite is normally the
case. Since the algebra is almost identical, we simply assume that f > g in which
case a0 = 0 and we can write the first order conditions for the news maker in an
interior solution as:
dpi0
d p
=
(γ− p− f a1z(1−b))
γ
− p
γ
f a1
z(1−b) = 0
dpi0
dz
=
p
γ
p− f a1
z2(1−b) −C
′(z) = 0
a1 =
bp
f (1+2b−b2)
The assumptions on the convexity of C(z) ensures a unique solution to these
equations exist, and that the profit of the news maker increases in c only via the
existence or not of a competitor (once an entrant has come in, c is irrelevant). The
interesting aspect of the model is that it might be optimal for the news maker to deter
entry by reducing price or quality. To show the flavour of the general dynamics,
figures 5 and 6 give results for selected simulations of the model.
The three lines in both figures correspond to three different simulation runs
where b differs from low (0.2) to high (0.8). The horizontal axis measures c which is
reversed-spaced logarithmically, ranging from 10 to 0.001. In Figure 5, the vertical
axis is the level of quality chosen by the news maker, while in Figure 6, it shows
the level of profits of the news maker. As we can see, with the Low-Copy and
Medium-Copy lines, there are three distinct regions.
The first region relates to when search costs are so high that the news maker
simply chooses the monopoly level of news quality without being influenced by the
threat of entry. In this first region, quality is constant. The second region relates
to intermediate levels of search costs where the news maker reduces the quality
level (and obtains lower profits) to prevent entry. That second region is typified
by gradually reducing quality levels. The third region relates to very low levels of
search costs where there is a copying competitor and both quality and profit levels
are low but constant. The parameter ranges have been chosen such that one can
see cases where a news maker would almost immediately make negative profits as
soon as the possibility of an entrant becomes salient (this the High-Copy case with
b = 0.8), as well as cases where a news maker continues to make positive profits
but simply responds to a competitor by having lower prices (the Low-Copy and
Medium-Copy cases). These simulations also show that the relationship between
search costs and optimal levels of quality is not necessarily monotonic20
20We also tried endogenising b by making it a function of investments in search. This makes the
model analytically intractable while the simulations provide no further insights.
5 Conclusions
The effect of the internet on the provision of high-quality news has been much
debated in the media itself. Bloggers have been accused of recycling the news gath-
ered by traditional media providers, making it unprofitable for these providers to
produce high-quality news in the first place. In this paper, we examine historic
trends in the media industry in the U.S. and study the impact of digital technologies
on the provision and uptake of high-quality news. We present a simple textbook-
style theoretical model to explain the stylized facts characterizing the media indus-
try at present.
Our model predicts that internet-based delivery of high-quality news would
only survive as an advertising-based market because reduced search costs due to
the internet make it virtually impossible to capture the rents of news itself. Thus
news will have to pay for itself indirectly, just as it has done in the past. Empiri-
cally, this appears to be exactly what is happening, with online news provision in
the US nearly doubling in that last 4 years alone. Furthermore, specialized high-
quality outlets catering to specific markets have also boomed in this period (eg. the
Economist, the New Yorker, National Geographic). Hence the empirical picture that
emerges is the de-bundling of news: mainstream audiences get ‘soft news’ while in-
dividuals interested in specific news get it from specialized sources and mainly pay
for it via their exposure to advertising.
One recent trend appears to go against the prediction of our model which is
that some newspapers have started charging consumers for online access; while the
Wall Street Journal has always charged for access to the vast majority of its online
content, the Times newspaper in the UK and Le Figaro in France have recently fol-
lowed suit. A number of other newspapers, both in the US and worldwide, are also
debating the reintroduction of paid access. However, the Wall Street Journal’s suc-
cess with the paid-subscription model is attributed to its financial analysis which is
considered unique and more timely than what competitors offer. Moreover, the av-
erage consumer of theWall Street Journal news is educated and has above-average
earnings, making her appealing to advertisers. Unless other newspapers also offer
something unique and appealing to high-income consumers, it is difficult to envis-
age the subscription-based model becoming the new economic model for the media
industry.
It is also imporant to keep in mind that the few newspapers that charge for
access still rely mainly on advertising for their revenue; what we are witnessing is
more an attempt to prevent the rent-skimming associated by internet-copiers rather
than getting individuals to pay for news itself. Given that the online advertising
market is expected to recover and grow quickly21, it will remain the case that the
online business model is advertising based. News providers will try to reduce rent-
skimming of news-copiers by technical and legal means, rather than demanding
21Analysts expect that the U.S. online advertising market will grow to between $26 billion and
$30 billion in 2011 (Holahan, 2007).
subscription fees from consumers.
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